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Congressional
Research Service ˜
The Library of Congress CRS
Report for Congress Al-Qaida
training manual shows seaports top target
Updated
December 5, 2003 John
F. Frittelli Analyst
in Transportation Resources,
Science, and Industry Division Port
and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 heightened awareness about the vulnerability to terrorist attack of all modes of transportation. Port security has emerged as a significant part of the overall debate on U.S. homeland security. The overarching issues for Congress are providing oversight on current port security programs and making or responding to proposals to improve port security. The U.S. maritime system consists of more than 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. However, a large fraction of maritime cargo is concentrated at a few major ports. Most ships calling at U.S. ports are foreign owned with foreign crews. Container ships have been the focus of much of the attention on seaport security because they are seen as vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. More than 6 millionmarine containers enterU.S. ports each year. While the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) analyzes cargo information to target specific shipments for closer inspection, it physically inspects only a small fraction of the containers. The Coast Guard and CBP are the federal agencies with the strongest presence in seaports. In response to September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard created the largest port-security operation since World War II. The Coast Guard has advanced its 24- hour Notice of Arrival (NOA) for ships to a 96-hour NOA. The NOA allows Coast Guard officials to select high risk ships for boarding upon their arrival at the entrance to a harbor. CBP has also advanced the timing of cargo information it receives from ocean carriers. Through the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program, CBP inspectors pre-screen U.S.-bound marine containers at foreign ports of loading. To raise port security standards, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) in November 2002. In the 108th Congress, implementation issues involving various security provisions in the Act are being debated. There is growing debate about whether current efforts to improve port security are adequate in addressing the threat. While many agree that Coast Guard and CBP programs to address the threat are sound, they contend that these programs represent only a framework for building a maritime security regime, and that significant gaps in security still remain. Congress is also continuing debate on how to generate funds for improving the security infrastructure of ports. This report will be updated periodically. Key
Policy Staff: Port and Maritime Security Area
of expertise Name Phone E-mail Transportation Security Admin. John Frittelli 7-7033 jfrittelli@crs.loc.gov Navy & Coast Guard Ronald O’Rourke 7-7610 rorourke@crs.loc.gov Customs & Border Protection Jennifer Lake 7-0620 jlake@crs.loc.gov Nuclear terrorism Jonathan Medalia 7-7632 jmedalia@crs.loc.gov Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Concerns for Port Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Features of the U.S. Maritime System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 U.S. Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Commercial Ships UsingU.S. Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cargo Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Importance of the U.S. Maritime System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Economic Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 National Security Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Port Security Threat Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Port and Ship Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Port Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Container Shipments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Maritime Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Government Authorities at Seaports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Port Governance and Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Federal Agencies Involved in Port Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Port Security Initiatives by Federal Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Bureau of Customs and Border Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Transportation SecurityAdministration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Maritime Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 International Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Recent Law on Port Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Addressing the Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Funding Port Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Sources of Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Allocating Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Resources for Foreign Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Balancing Security and Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Point of Origin Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Vessels Under Foreign Ownership and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 International Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Standard vs. Site-Specific Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 SecurityCards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Intelligence Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Private Industry’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1
This report was prepared with assistance from Jennifer Lake, Jonathan
Medalia, and Ronald
O’Rourke. 2
For other CRS products relating to port security and other aspects of
homeland security, see
CRS Report RS21293, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and
Response; CRS
Report RS21125, Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations - Background and Issues
for Congress; CRS Report
RS21230, Homeland Security: Navy Operations - Background
and Issues for Congress. 3
Admiral James M. Loy and Captain G. Ross, U.S. Coast Guard, “Global
Trade: America’s Achilles
Heel,” Defense Horizons, Feb. 2002. An asymmetrical threat is a
military or (continued...) Port
and Maritime Security: Background and Issues
for Congress1 Introduction This report provides background information and discusses potential issues for Congress on the topic of port security, which has emerged as a significant part of the overall debate on U.S. homeland security.2 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 heightened awareness about the vulnerability to terrorist attack of U.S. ports and the ships in them. The issue for Congress is providing oversight on port security and proposals for improving it. Port security legislation can have significant implications for public safety, the war on terrorism, the U.S. and global economy, and federal, state, and local homeland security responsibilities and expenditures. Background Concerns
for Port Security Government leaders and security experts are worried that the maritime transportation system could be used by terrorists to smuggle personnel, weapons of mass destruction, or other dangerous materials into the United States. They are also concerned that ships in U.S. ports, particularly large commercial cargo ships or cruise ships, could be attacked by terrorists. Experts are concerned that a large-scale terrorist attack at a U.S. port could not only cause local death and damage, but also paralyze global maritime commerce. James M. Loy, the former Commandant of the Coast Guard and now deputy secretary nominee at the Department of Homeland Security, has described the nation’s maritime transportation system as a natural gateway into America for asymmetrical military and terrorist threats.3 The Commissioner of the Bureau of CRS-2 3
(...continued) terrorist
method or tactic that does not mirror (i.e., is not symmetrical with) U.S.
military capabilities.
Asymmetrical attacks avoid an enemy’s strengths and attack the enemy’s weaknesses
instead. 4
Speech given at the Center for Strategic and International Studies dated
Aug. 26, 2002, available
at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/ (viewed
12/4/03) 5
RAND Europe, Seacurity: Improving the Security of the Global
Sea-Container Shipping System,
2003. 6
Report of the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, Fall
2000, p.
63. 7
GAO, Port Security, Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful,
GAO-02-993T, Aug. 5,
2002. 8
Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations, America
Still Unprepared - America Still in Danger, October
2002. Customs and Border Protection, Robert Bonner, has stated that there is “virtually no security for what is the primary system to transport global trade.”4 Despite the progress that has been made in improving maritime security since September 11, a recent study by RAND Europe reports that “the maritime sector and specifically the container transport sector remain wide-open to the terrorist threat” and that “the system is perceived to be poorly defended against misuse and terrorism due to its global
and open nature.”5 Government officials and security experts were concerned about the security of U.S. ports even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the fall of 2000, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports noted the vulnerability of U.S. seaports to terrorism. The commission reported that a terrorist attack at a U.S. port could lead to significant loss of life, damage property and infrastructure, cause extensive environmental damage, and disrupt business and trade. The report noted that while the FBI then considered the threat of terrorist attacks on U.S. seaports to be low, their vulnerability to such attacks was high.6 On July 20, 2001, SenatorHollings introduced S. 1214, theMaritime Transportation SecurityAct of 2001, a bill intended to strengthen U.S. port security. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, significantly heightened awareness about the vulnerability of U.S. ports and ships to a terrorist attack. In the months following the attacks, congressional committees held several hearings on the issue. In August 2002, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted field investigations of several U.S. seaports and found that ports are inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of their size, easy accessibility by water and land, and the tremendous amount of cargo that is typically transferred through them.7 And in October 2002, a security task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations recommended that resources be reallocated to bolster sea and land transportation security, asserting that the surface transportation system is far more vulnerable than the nation’s aviation system.8 In response to concerns for port security, onNovember 14, 2002, Congress passed S. 1214, as amended, the Maritime Transportation CRS-3 9
For further information on the U.S.maritime system, see U.S.
DOT,Maritime Admin., An Assessment
of the U.S. Marine Transportation System, Sept.
1999. Available at [http://www.marad.dot.gov/]. 10
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Navigation Data Center ranks U.S.
ports by dollar value
and tons of cargo imported and exported. See [www.iwr.usace.army.mil/ndc/]. 11
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,Maritime Transportation
SecurityAct of 2002, Conference
Report, H.Rept. 107-777, p. 4. 12
How Did This Happen? ed.
James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, (New York: Public Affairs,
2001), p.186. 13
“The Maritime Component,” Sea Power, August 2001. Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), and the President signed it into law as P.L. 107-295 on November 25, 2002. Features
of the U.S. Maritime System U.S. Ports. The U.S. maritime system includes more than 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals and more than 1,000 harbor
channels spread along thousands of miles of coastline.9 Transportation firms tend to concentrate traffic through major cargo hubs because of the high cost of their infrastructure.10 The top 50 ports in the United States account for about 90% of all cargo tonnage and 25 U.S. ports account for 98% of all container shipments.11 Energy products are concentrated at particular ports. For instance, almost one-quarter of California’s imported crude oil is offloaded in one
geographically confined area.12 Commercial Ships Using U.S. Ports. In 2001, approximately 5,400 commercial ships made more than 60,000 U.S. port calls. Most ships calling at U.S. ports are foreign owned and foreign crewed; less than 3% of U.S. overseas trade is carried
on U.S.-flag vessels.13 Cargo Containers. Container ships are a growing segment of maritime commerce – and the focus of much of the attention on seaport security. Container ships carry stacks of marine containers loaded with a wide variety of goods. A large container ship can carry more than 3,000 containers, ofwhich several hundred might be offloaded at a given port. Amarine container is similar to a truck trailerwithout wheels; standard sizes are 8x8x20 feet or 8x8x40 feet. Once offloaded from ships, they are transferred to rail cars or tractor-trailers or barges for inland transportation. Over-the-road weight regulations generally limit the cargo load of a 40 foot container to approximately 45,000 pounds. The estimated world inventory of containers is about 12 million. Container ships tend to carry higher-value cargo than other types of cargo ships. While they represent only 11% of annual tonnage, they account for 66% of the total value of U.S. maritime overseas trade. Containerized imports are dominated by consumer goods, such as clothing, shoes, electronics, and toys. U.S. automakers also CRS-4 14
For a list of the top importers and exporters of containerizedmarine
cargo, see “Inside the box,”
Journal of Commerce, Aug. 12-18, 2002, p. 20A. 15
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review
of Maritime Transport
2002. 16
For further information, see OECD, Security in Maritime Transport:
Risk Factors and Economic
Impact, Maritime
Transport Committee, July 2003. 17
Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations, America
Still Unprepared - America Still in Danger, October
2002, p. 23. import large quantities of parts in containers. Containerized exports are dominated by
wastepaper, forest products, chemicals, and agricultural products.14 More than 6 million cargo containers enter U.S. sea ports each year. For comparison, about 13 million containers arrive by truck or rail from Canada and Mexico. CBP analyzes cargo manifest information for each container to decide which to target for closer inspection, based on such factors as origin, destination, shipper, and container contents. Only a small portion have their contents physically inspected by CBP. Physical inspection could include scanning the entire container with a sophisticated x-ray or gamma ray machine, unloading the contents of a container, or both. Importance
of the U.S. Maritime System Economic Importance. Ships are the primary mode of transportation for world trade. Ships carry approximately80% of world trade by volume.15 TheUnited States is the world’s leading maritime trading nation, accounting for nearly 20% (measured in tons) of the annual world oceanborne overseas trade. Ships carry more than 95% of the nation’s non-North American trade by weight and 75% by value. Trade now accounts for 25% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), up from 11% in 1970. Over the next two decades, the total volume of domestic and international trade is expected to double. Given the importance of maritime trade to the U.S. and world economies, disruptions to that trade can have immediate and significant economic impacts.16 By one estimate, the cost to the U.S. economy of the recent port closures on the West Coast due to a labor- management dispute was approximately $1 billion per day for the
first five days, rising sharply thereafter.17 The container shipping system is designed for speed and efficiency. Transportation services are a critical component of the global, low-inventory (i.e., just-in-time) distribution model that many manufacturers have adopted. Most industries in the United States use some imported components from overseas suppliers. By bringing parts to a plant just before they are needed for assembly, manufacturers can save money on warehouse space and inventory carrying costs. Transport efficiencies permit warehouse requirements to be minimized. Lean inventories in turn have contributed to business productivity. From 1980 to 2000, CRS-5 18
Michael Wolfe, North River Consulting Group, Freight Transportation
Security and Productivity,
report prepared for
U.S.DOT,EU/USForumon Intermodal FreightTransport, Apr.
11-13, 2001. 19
Admiral James M. Loy and Captain Robert G. Ross, “Global Trade,
America’s Achilles Heel,”
Defense Horizons, Feb. 2002. 20
For further information on ACE, see [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/modernization/]
(viewed 12/4/03). according to one study, business logistics costs dropped from 16.1% of U.S. GDP to 10.1%.18 Given the dependence of the United States and the global economy on a highly efficientmaritime transportation system,manyexperts acknowledge that slowing the flow of trade to inspect all inbound containers, or at least a statistically significant random selection would be, in the words of James M. Loy, former Coast Guard Commandant and now deputy secretary nominee at the Department of Homeland Security, “economically intolerable.”19 Supply chain analysts are concerned that increased security-related delay at seaports could threaten the efficiency gains achieved in inventorymanagement over the past two decades by forcing companies to hold larger inventories. Enhanced security has benefits as well as costs. Many experts see economic benefits to tighter control over maritime commerce. Resources put towards seaport security can also reduce cargo theft, narcotic and migrant smuggling, trade law violations, the accidental introduction of invasive species, and the cost of cargo insurance. Improved planning for responding to a terrorist attack at a seaport could also improve responses to other emergencies, such as natural disasters or transportation accidents. Newtechnologies intended to convert the sea container into a “smart box,” such as electronic seals, sensors, or tracking devices, could also improve shipment integrity, help carriers improve their equipment utilization, and help cargo owners track their shipments. In response to the terrorist threat, the CBP has accelerated development of its new information management system, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). This system will assist CBP in evaluating cargo manifest information for high risk shipments but will also speed the customs
filing process for U.S. importers.20 National Security Importance. In addition to its economic significance, the marine transportation system is vital for national security. The Departments of Defense and Transportation have designated 17 U.S. seaports as strategic because they are necessary for use by DOD in the event of a major military deployment. Thirteen of these ports are commercial seaports. During Desert Storm, 90% of all military equipment and supplies were shipped from U.S. strategic ports. The deployment required over 312 vessels from 18 commercial and military ports in the United States. As the GAO has reported, “If the strategic ports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be CRS-6 21
GAO, Combating Terrorism, Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection
for DOD Deployments
through Domestic Seaports, GAO-03-15,
Oct. 2002. 22
In an offshore “lightering” zone, a very large crude carrier (VLCC)
or “supertanker” transfers
part of its cargo to a smaller shuttle tanker that delivers the crude oil to the
tank farm
or refinery onshore. There are also offshore oil ports where a tanker discharges
its cargo
through a submerged pipeline that carries the cargo along the seabed to the
onshore terminal. sustained, but DOD could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily
on its overburdened airlift capabilities.”21 Port
Security Threat Scenarios Security experts are concerned about a variety of terrorist threat scenarios at U.S. ports. Among other things, they are concerned that terrorists could: ! use commercial cargo containers to smuggle terrorists, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, components thereof, or other dangerous materials into the United States; ! seize control of a large commercial cargo ship and use it as a collision weapon for destroying a bridge or refinery located on the waterfront; ! sink a large commercial cargo ship in a major shipping channel, thereby blocking all traffic to and from the port; ! attack a large ship carrying a volatile fuel (such as liquefied natural gas) and detonate the fuel so as to cause amassive in-port explosion; ! attack an oil tanker in a port or at an offshore discharge facility22 so as to disrupt the world oil trade and cause large-scale environmental damage; ! seize control of a ferry (which can carry hundreds of passengers) or a cruise ship (which can carry more than 3,000 passengers, of whom about 90% are usually U.S. citizens) and threaten the deaths of the passengers if a demand is not met; ! attack U.S. Navy ships in an attempt to kill U.S. military personnel, damage or destroy a valuable U.S. military asset, and (in the case of nuclear-powered ships) cause a radiological release. ! use land around a port to stage attacks on bridges, refineries located on the waterfront, or other port facilities. Some of these scenarios (or similar ones) have already come to pass elsewhere. For example, in October 2002, the French oil tanker Limberg appears to have been attacked by a bomb-laden boat off the coast of Yemen, killing one crewman aboard CRS-7 23
“Ships as terrorist targets,” American Shipper, Nov. 2002,
p.59. 24
His lawyers argued that he was a Maronite Christian fleeing religious
discrimination and personal
legal problems in Egypt who was shipping his possessions to Canada and planned to
fly from Rome to Montreal. (He was also carrying a plane ticket.) Charges
against him were
dropped and he was ordered freed from jail in mid-November 2001. (Italian Court Frees
Canadian Suspect. Toronto Star, November 16, 2002.) 25
CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on U.S.S. Cole: Background and
Issues for Congress. 26
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Customs Service. Robert Bonner, U.S.
Customs Commissioner,
Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,
D.C., January 17, 2002. [http://www.customs.gov/about/speeches/speech0117- 02.htm]. 27
U.S. DOT, Surface Transportation Security: Vulnerabilities and
Developing Solutions, (continued...) the tanker, damaging the ship, and causing an oil spill.23 In October 2001, Italian authorities arrested on terrorism charges an Egyptian-born Canadian citizen found with high-tech equipment (including a satellite phone and a computer) and other personal possessions in a cargo container in an Italian port.24 In October 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole was attacked by a bomb-laden boat during a refueling stop in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors, injuring 39 others, and causing damage to the ship that cost about $250 million to repair.25 In 1985, terrorists seized the cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean and held its passengers hostage, killing one of them. Much concern has focused on the threat that a sea container could be used to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States. Experts are concerned that if a nuclear weapon in a container aboard a ship in port is detonated, it could not only kill tens of thousands of people and cause massive destruction, but could also paralyze the
movement of cargo containers globally, thereby shutting down world trade.26 Port
and Ship Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Attack Port Facilities. Port areas and ships in ports have many vulnerabilities to potential terrorist attack. Port areas have very large landside perimeters to secure, giving terrorists many potential landside points of entry. Some ports are located immediately adjacent to built-up urban areas, giving terrorists places to hide while approaching or escaping from port areas. Large numbers of trucks move in and out of ports, making it possible for terrorists to use a truck to bring themselves and their weapons into a port. Many ports harbor fishing and recreational boats that terrorists could use to mask their approach to a target ship. Ships. Commercial cargo ships at pier or at anchorage in harbor are stationary, and those moving through port do so at slow speeds, making them easy to intercept by a fast-moving boat. Commercial cargo ships are generally unarmed and have very small crews, making them vulnerable to seizure by a small group of armed people, as proven by modern-day pirates. In the 1990s, the number of reported attacks on cargo ships by pirates tripled.27 Most pirate attacks occur while the ship is in port. CRS-8 27
(...continued) n.d.,
n.p., [www.fta.dot.gov/research/safe/pubs/sursec/sursec.html]. 28
“The Maritime Threat from Al Qaeda,” Financial Times, October
20, 2003. 29
OECD, Ownership and Control of Ships, Maritime Transport
Committee, March 2003, p.
5. 30
See “15 Freighters Believed to be linked to al Qaeda,” The
Washington Post, Dec. 31, 2002,
p.A1. Also, “Terrorism - Bin Laden group shipping interests probed,” Lloyd’s
List, Sept.
28, 2001. 31
See, Arun Chatterjee, An Overview of Security Issues Involving Marine
Containers and Ports,
proceedings of the 2003
Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, available on
CD-ROM. Although most attacks occur in Southeast Asian waters on foreign-flag freighters, U.S. shippers are likely to be among the owners of cargo onboard. It can also be noted that some experts believe there is a link between piracy and terrorism – that the goal of some acts of piracy may be to raise money to finance terrorist operations. The Financial Times has reported an incident where a chemical tanker in the south Pacificwas boarded by pirateswho practiced steering the vessel at varying speeds for several
hours.28 The lack of transparency in ship registration has been a longstanding concern. An Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study on the ownership and control of ships reports that: Not
only does perfect transparency not exist, but in fact anonymity seems to be the
rule rather than the exception, and not only is it permitted, but in many cases positively
encouraged. This enables terrorists and would be terrorists to remain intimately
involved in the operation of their vessels, while maintaining totally hidden,
through the use of relatively simple mechanisms that are readily available
and legally tolerated in almost all jurisdictions.29 Unscrupulous ship owners are known to mask their identity by re-registering their vessels under fictitious corporate names and renaming and repainting their ships. Shipowners can register their vessels in “flag of convenience” countries which may have lax regulations and require little information from the applicants. According to press reports,U.S. intelligence officials believe they have identified 15 cargo
ships that have links to al Qaeda.30 Container Shipments. The complexity of the process for completing containerized shipments makes itmore difficult to ensure the integrity of this type of cargo.31 Unlike other cargo shipswhose loading process occurs at the port and whose cargo is often owned by a single company, container ships carry cargo from hundreds of companies and the containers are loaded awayfrom the port at individual company warehouses. A typical single container shipment may involve a multitude of parties and generate 30 to 40 documents. A single container could also carry cargo for several customers, thus multiplying the number of parties and documents involved. The parties involved in a shipment usually include the exporter, the importer, a freight forwarder, a customs broker, a customs inspector, inland transportation CRS-9 32
How Did This Happen? ed.
James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, (New York: Public Affairs,
2001), p. 188. 33
“Executive Viewpoint, Joe M. Baker, Jr. Exec. Director, NCSC,” Journal
of Commerce, May
8, 2002. 34
“Cargo Crime Bill Hit,” Traffic World, Oct. 9, 2000. provider(s) (whichmay include more than one trucker or railroad), the port operators, possibly a feeder ship, and the ocean carrier. Each transfer of the container from one party to the next is a point of vulnerability in the supply chain. The security of each transfer facility and the trustworthiness of each company is therefore critical in the overall security of the shipment. It is also important to keep in mind that not all U.S.- bound containers arrive at U.S. ports. Half of the containers discharged at the Port of Montreal, for instance, move by truck or rail for cities in the northeastern or midwestern United States.32 Also, many containers that enter U.S. waters are bound for other nations. Maritime Crimes. Security experts warn that terrorists attempting to use a container to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction or components thereof into the United States could purchase a known exporter with a long and trustworthy shipping record. Drug smugglers have been known to employ this strategy to disguise their contraband in otherwise legitimate cargo. While both the Coast Guard and CBP are experienced in the marine environment with the “war on drugs,” they recognize that terrorism is a different kind of threat. Among other things, drug smugglers are often interested in finding a smuggling method that can be used over and over to make multiple shipments. This permits the Coast Guard and CBP to look for certain patterns of operation among drug smugglers. Terrorists, on the other hand, aremore likely to be interested in using a particular method of attack only once, to carry out a particular terrorist operation. This makes the tactic of looking for patterns of operation potentially much less useful. Another difference concerns the potential consequences of failure to detect and intercept: Given the tremendous amount of cargo arriving at seaports, the mission of interdicting illegal drugs or a weapon of mass destruction is often described as searching for the needle in the haystack. In the case of the weapon of mass destruction, however, the potential consequence of not finding the so-called needle is much greater. The incidence of other shipping-related crimes also attests to the challenges faced in improving port security. The NationalCargo Security Council estimates that cargo theft domestically ranges between $10 billion and $15 billion annually.33 The FBI believes much of this theft occurs in or near seaports.34 Identifying where cargo theft occurs in the transportation systemmay help identifywhere terrorist infiltration could occur. Government
Authorities at Seaports Port Governance and Financing. In considering how to enhance seaport security, it is important to know how they are governed and operated. The governing structure of ports varies from place to place. While the federal government has jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce and designated federal waterway CRS-10 35
U.S. DOT,Maritime Administration, Public Port Finance Survey for
FY1999, Jan. 2001. 36
The Navy and the Coast Guard agree that the Coast Guard is the lead
federal agency for the
maritime component of homeland security, and that the Navy’s role is to
support the Coast
Guard in areas where the Coast Guard’s capabilities are limited or lacking,
such as air
defense or antisubmarine warfare. For more on the Navy’s role in homeland
security, see
CRS Report RS21230, Homeland Security: Navy Operations – Background and
Issues for
Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. channels, state or local governments have ownership over ports. There are ports which are part of state government and others which are part of city government. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Delaware River Port Authority are examples of bi-state or regional port agencies. Ports can be a subsidiary of a public agency but may be structured to act as a private sector corporation. Most ports are “landlord ports,” which means the port provides the basic services and infrastructure but the tenant, such as a terminal operator, performs most of the activity. “Operating ports” both generate and carry out most of the activity at the port. In addition to city law enforcement personnel, some port authorities also have their own police forces. Depending on how they are structured, ports finance infrastructure improvements through a variety of means. Some may levy taxes, if they are granted this authority. Ports may also pay for infrastructure with the general funds they receive from the governments they are a part of, from operating revenues, general obligation bonds, revenue bonds, trust fund monies, or loan guarantees. Most ports generally
break even or are minimally profitable.35 Federal Agencies Involved in Port Security. Federal agencies involved in port security include the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), all of which are housed in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Maritime Administration (MARAD). The Coast Guard and CBP are the two federal agencies with the strongest presence at seaports. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is the nation’s principal maritime law enforcement authority and the lead federal agency for the maritime component of homeland security, including port security.36 Among other things, the Coast Guard is responsible for evaluating, boarding, and inspecting commercial ships as they approach U.S. waters, for countering terrorist threats in U.S. ports, and for helping to protect U.S. Navy ships in U.S. ports. Ahigh-ranking Coast Guard officer in each port area serves as the Captain of the Port (COTP), who is lead federal official responsible for the security and safety of the vessels and waterways in his or her geographic zone. Under the terms of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-340) and the recently enactedMaritime Transportation SecurityAct of 2002, the Coast Guard has responsibility to protect vessels and harbors from subversive acts. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. TheBureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the federal agency with principal responsibility for CRS-11 37
For further information on the Coast Guard as it relates to homeland
security, see CRS (continued...) inspecting cargoes, including cargo containers, that commercial ships bring intoU.S. ports and for the examination and inspection of ship crews and cruise ship passengers for ships arriving in U.S. ports from any foreign port. Prior to the establishment of the CBP, customs and immigration functions at U.S. borders were conducted separately by the Department of the Treasury’s U.S. Customs Service and the Department of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service. Transportation Security Administration. TSA is an agency created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-71). Initially, its focus was the security of air transportation but it is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, cargo and passenger. Maritime Administration. MARAD, which is part of the Department of Transportation (DOT), is a civilian agency that supports the U.S. commercial maritime industry. MARAD publishes regular Maritime Security Reports and a national planning guide on port security. MTSA requires MARAD to publish a revised version of its national planning guide on port security. Port
Security Initiatives by Federal Agencies Coast Guard. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard created the largest port-security operation since World War II. Coast Guard cutters and aircraft were diverted from more distant operating areas to patrol U.S. ports and coastal waters. The Coast Guard began to maintain security zones around waterside facilities, Navyships, and cruise and cargo ships entering or leaving port. Coast Guard port security teams began to inspect certain high-interest vessels, and Coast Guard sea marshals began escorting certain ships transiting the harbor. To counter the terrorist threat, the CoastGuard andCBP have sought to improve the quality and advance the timing of information submitted to themby shippers and carriers so that they can better evaluate the terrorist risk of ships, cargo, or crew bound for the United States. By increasing their knowledge of the various parties in the marine environment it is hoped that federal authorities will be better able to separate the bad from the good without impeding the flow of legitimate commerce. In support of this goal, the Coast Guard has instituted new reporting requirements for ships entering and leaving U.S. harbors. The former 24-hour advance Notice of Arrival (NOA) has been extended to a 96-hour NOA. The NOA includes detailed information on the crew, passengers, cargo, and the vessel itself. TheCoast Guard has also developed the concept ofmaritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA involves fusing intelligence information with informa |
