Last month"s attack on the Shiite Askariya shrine and the surge of
sectarian bloodshed that followed have convinced many around the world that
Iraq is now " on the brink" of civil war. In fact, a March 6 ABC
News/Washington Post poll suggested that 80 percent of Americans believe
that " it"s likely that the Shiite-Sunni conflict will lead to
civil war in Iraq."
Such fears may be exaggerated in the near-term. But the escalation of
violence and the inability of Iraq"s newly elected leaders to make more
progress toward the formation of a viable central government make an
eventual civil war increasingly likely. With that in mind, an important
question remains unanswered: What would civil war in Iraq actually look
like?
First, an Iraqi civil war would imply the complete collapse of the
country"s central government. There is still reason to hope that Iraqis
can form a government capable of carrying out its basic functions, even if
it remains unable to enforce laws in some areas of the country. This
government would have the vitally important opportunity to revise the Iraqi
constitution and to ensure that resource-poor minority Sunnis have adequate
political representation in the new Iraq and an equitable share of the
country"s natural wealth.
But if these changes are not made -- or if the central government collapses
-- we can expect that Iraq will break into three autonomous blocs that
represent the Kurdish north, Sunni center and Shiite south of the country,
plunging Iraq into widespread sectarian fighting and putting an end to
international reconstruction aid.
Most troubling, other states in the region would scramble to fill the vacuum
of power left by the central government"s disintegration. Iran and
Saudi Arabia would finance and support warring Shiite and Sunni militias in
the country as proxies for their regional rivalry. If Iraq indeed becomes a
regional battleground, the fighting there would deepen the political
conflict between Sunnis and Shiites elsewhere in the region and provoke a
surge in conventional military spending throughout the Middle East. It would
raise the stakes for further nuclear proliferation, increase tensions
between Middle Eastern states and their international allies, and raise
concerns for the stability of Iraq"s neighbors.
For example, over time, an Iraqi civil war could destabilize the Jordanian
monarchy, as Iraqi refugees surge across the border and overwhelm
Jordan"s ability to handle them. Islamists among the fleeing Iraqis
might well take root there and bring the insurgency with them. Also
vulnerable are Sunni-dominated Gulf states with significant (and potentially
restive) Shiite populations. Saudi Arabia would face increased risks from
the minority Shiites who dominate the country"s oil-rich Eastern
Province, which borders Iraq. Bahrain, a majority-Shiite state governed by a
Sunni royal family, is likewise vulnerable to sectarian unrest.
Yet, it"s also important to outline the risks that civil war would not
pose for Iraq. First, even in a civil war environment, substantial amounts
of Iraqi oil would continue to flow. True, there wouldn"t be any
meaningful new energy investment, because the central government
wouldn"t be able to pass laws and regulations that regularize business
operations. Infrastructure reconstruction would come to a virtual
standstill. The northern pipeline that transports Iraqi oil to the Turkish
port of Ceyhan has already faced numerous stoppages and would remain
vulnerable to any uptick in violence. But oil from Iraq"s south, nearly
two-thirds of the country"s current production, would probably continue
to flow within a range of 1 to 1.4 million barrels per day.
Second, a civil war would raise the specter of Turkish military intervention
in Iraq"s Kurdish northern provinces, but would not, as some claim,
provoke an all-out war. An autonomous Kurdish republic is highly unlikely in
the near-term to declare formal statehood, the likeliest trigger for any
Turkish incursion. Virtually all the current Kurdish political leaders
recognize that they have too much to lose from a move toward formal
independence.
In addition, neither Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan nor the Turkish
military favor sending troops into the strategically vital, oil-rich Kurdish
city of Kirkuk, a move that would put enormous strain on Turkey"s
relationship with the United States -- to say nothing of its ongoing efforts
to join the European Union.
Turkey would more likely deploy large numbers of troops along the Iraqi
border, and seek (and probably receive) U.S. and EU support to move some of
them 15 to 20 kilometers into Iraqi territory to establish a buffer zone
against Kurdish militants and Islamist insurgents. The move would weigh on
Turkish markets, provoke limited capital flight and effectively end the
cross-border trade that has boosted both the Turkish and Kurdish economies.
The incursion would be closely monitored all over the world, but would stop
short of provoking an all-out war.
Third, an Iraqi civil war would increase the risk of terrorist attacks in
the region, but is unlikely to produce any sudden, dramatic surge in their
number or intensity. Iraqi insurgents have upgraded both their weapons and
the technical skills with which they use them, but the threats they pose
other countries in the region would remain relatively modest. Suicide
bombings, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Arab-dominated Iranian
province of Khuzestan might increase, but they would not pose fundamental
threats to the stability of these countries.
Civil war in Iraq is not inevitable. If Iraq"s newly elected leaders
can form a government that the majority of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds can
accept, and if they can revise the Iraqi constitution to better fulfill the
needs of all three groups, they can reduce the risk of widespread sectarian
conflict. But the risk of civil war is growing. Understanding what an Iraqi
civil war does and does not imply is important for preparing for this
worst-case scenario, one that only Islamic radicals hope will come to pass.
Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy. His
forthcoming book, " The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations
Rise and Fall," will be published by Simon & Schuster this
September.He can be reached via e-mail at research@eurasiagroup.net.
©2006 Tribune Media Services
