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.The U.S.-India Nuclear Power Deal When President Bush left American soil for Delhi last month, his mission was quite clear: firmly establish the roots for a U.S.-India alliance. An alliance with India is certainly an incredibly worthwhile objective. The resulting deal, which would make India's civilian nuclear program transparent while allowing its military program to proceed in secrecy, addresses India's dire need for more efficient and environmentally-friendly energy sources. Despite the benefits both for India and American nuclear contractors, the deal, in its present form, threatens to undermine global security by formally exempting India from nuclear guidelines set forth in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
India's well-documented status as the world's largest democracy is enhanced by its ability to placate potentially corrosive sectarian tensions resulting from myriad linguistic groups and several religious cleavages. Its technology and services economy?driven by its wealth of talented computer scientists and engineers?is booming, growing at eight percent over the last fiscal year. Moreover, it has proven better at investing, avoiding corruption, and reducing state control of the economy than its authoritarian, East Asian counterpart, China. For all these reasons India is an ideal partner for America in Asia.
However, India also has its faults. India is one of the world's worst emitters of greenhouse gases, due largely to its reliance on coal. While India is growing rapidly, it still lags behind China and other East Asian countries and some say it might be missing a golden opportunity for even more profound development. Additionally, while potential for violence generally subsided peacefully, the recent bombings in Varanasi demonstrated just how fragile the ethnic and religious balance in India might be.
Civilian nuclear power is one of India's most dire needs. Mass incorporation of nuclear energy into India's infrastructure could dramatically reduce India's dirty emissions. In a country of over one billion people, any small reduction could engender remarkable effects. The prospects are so promising that French President Jacques Chirac has been an outspoken proponent of the deal, certainly no small endorsement given his tumultuous relationship with the Bush Administration.
A nuclear deal with India also stands to benefit the U.S. economically. By allowing the sale of civilian nuclear technology to India, American and other foreign companies would reap the rewards of such a large and desperate market.
While these environmental and economic benefits should by no means be taken lightly, the deal also poses to become highly destabilizing throughout the world. India is not part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It first tested bombs in 1974 and most recently again in 1998. Despite India's claims that these tests serve security and deterrence purposes, many fear India harbors more aggressive intentions. The deal essentially circumvents the NPT, allowing India to designate 14 of its 22 nuclear power reactors as civilian and thus subject to routine sections, while the remaining eight will continue to produce nuclear weapons in absence of inspections. Allowing an exception to the NPT for India might set a dangerous precedent. In a time where America is encouraging sanctions on one of the world's most aggressive and dangerous nations for its nuclear ambitions, Iran, allowing such an exception could drastically reduce the legitimacy of the NPT in negotiations, a critical leverage. In addition, while President Bush did praise Pakistan in his short visit following his trip to Delhi, he refused to grant the nation equal access to nuclear material. Such a denial was certainly good judgment; Pakistan's poor nuclear record?its nuclear program developer, A.Q. Khan, reportedly sold plans for nuclear weapons to Iran, Libya, and other unstable countries?and the fact that Pakistan, unlike India, is not a stable democracy render it incapable of receiving a similar exemption. Nevertheless, favoring India over its bitter rival threatens to undermine the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan in the War on Terror. While India's status as a large democracy in a highly unstable region adds significance to its desire for security, there are areas for concern. Despite claims that its high-speed reactors are reserved strictly for civilian use, India nevertheless refused to include its high-speed reactors in its civilian program. Instead, India allowed them to be enveloped by its military program and thus not subject to inspections. Despite the utter need for civilian nuclear power, this lack of transparency over high-speed reactors, which could reportedly produce up to 50 bombs per year, suggests India may envision ulterior uses of its nuclear power. The deal remains subject to Congressional approval, however. Given the current lack of support for President Bush from both Republicans and Democrats, the negotiation is likely to be met with criticism by America's increasingly xenophobic legislature. There are some measures by which the deal could be improved. Pressuring India to include its high-speed reactors under its civilian program is one such possibility. Perhaps India does need nuclear power to ensure stability; it most definitely does not need nuclear power to the tune of 50 bombs per year. An even better?albeit idealistic?solution was posed by Thomas Friedman of the New York Times. Friedman suggests India should halt its weapons program altogether, much like the United States and the other four nuclear powers in the NPT. There are problems to these arguments, however. As Seema Gahlaut points out in Foreign Policy, the U.S. and other nuclear nations have adopted a formal halt to their weapons programs, but it currently stores some 450 weapons on European soil, which, under NATO, could by used by non-nuclear states in times of crisis. The deal must undergo intense scrutiny. Undoubtedly, experts on nuclear energy and proliferation will be quizzed on its potential ramifications. The U.S. should be stricter on India and force more concessions. Whether or not the deal goes forward as planned, a healthy alliance with India is fundamental to the United States' international and economic security. |
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